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For many application areas A/B testing, which partitions users of a system into an A (control) and B (treat-
ment) group to experiment between several application designs, enables Internet companies to optimize
their services to the behavioral patterns of their users. Unfortunately, the A/B testing framework cannot be
applied in a straightforward manner to applications like auctions where the users (a.k.a., bidders) submit
bids before the partitioning into the A and B groups is made. This paper combines auction theoretic mod-
eling with the A/B testing framework to develop methodology for A/B testing auctions. The accuracy of our
method is directly comparable to ideal A/B testing where there is no interference between A and B. Our
results are based on an extension and improved analysis of the inference method of Chawla et al. [2014].
1. INTRODUCTION
A common method in the practice of large scale auction design, e.g., in auctions placing
advertisements on online media and Internet search engines, is A/B testing. In A/B
testing, the auction house is running an incumbent mechanism A, and would like to
determine if a novel mechanism B obtains higher revenue. This is done by splitting
the traffic so that most of it goes to A and some of it, e.g., five to ten percent, goes to
B.1 An issue with this approach is that if the bidders are unaware of which mechanism
their bid will be considered in, the bid equilibrium is neither for A nor B but for a
mechanism C that is a convex combination of A and B.
A miscalculation sometimes performed in practice is to consider and compare aver-
age revenue from A (resp. B) from the times when A (resp. B) is run. This miscalcu-
lation is equivalent to simulating A on the bids in C and can often give the opposite
conclusion; e.g., if A and B are one- and two-unit highest-bids-win pay-your-bid auc-
tions, respectively, then B will always appear in this miscalculation to have higher
revenue. For a fixed set of bids, a pay-your-bid mechanism’s revenue is monotone in
its allocation probabilities. Of course, in equilibrium, increased allocation probabilities
can cause reduced revenue as bidders may lower their bids.
We present an A/B testing method that applies generally to the position auction
model popularized by the Varian [2007] and Edelman et al. [2007] analyses of auctions
for sponsored search and now a fundamental model for the study of auction theory;
e.g., see Hartline [2013]. To revisit the example auction scenario above, notice that the
mechanism C, namely the 50–50 convex combination of one- and two-unit auctions, is
mathematically equivalent to a position auction with weights 1 and 0.5 for the top two
slots respectively, and zero for all remaining slots. Mechanisms A and B are also po-
sition auctions. More generally, a position auction is defined by a decreasing sequence
of weights, bidders are assigned to positions in decreasing order of bids, and payments
are charged. Typical payment rules are “generalized first price” and “generalized sec-
ond price”; the former requires bidders to pay their weighted bid, whereas the latter
requires bidders to pay the weighted bid of the next highest bidder. (Unfortunately, for
reasons we describe subsequently, our methods do not apply to the generalized second
price position auction.) Position auctions with exogenously given weights are the stan-
dard model of auction for selling advertisements on Internet search engines. In this
application, the weights correspond to the probability that the ad in each position on
1For very thin markets, the ratio of the split can even be 50-50.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
6.
00
90
8v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
 Ju
n 2
01
6
the search results page will be clicked on (and payments are scaled by weights because
bidders only pay if they are clicked on).
Chawla et al. [2014] developed an estimator for the revenue of one position auction
(A or B) from the bids of another (C). This estimator is a simple weighted order statistic
of the distribution of equilibrium bids in C. To estimate the revenue of B (analogously
for A):
(1) for any number N , the evaluation of a formula based on the definition of B and C
gives N weights, and,
(2) given a sorted list of N i.i.d. samples from the bid distribution for C, the estimated
revenue of B is the weighted average of these bids.
This method of estimation compares favorably to ideal A/B testing, where the bids in
A are in equilibrium for A and revenue can be estimated by simple averaging, respec-
tively for B.
Our model of A/B testing is especially applicable to the following generalization of
the classical problem with fixed position weights. Consider the problem Google and
Bing face in selecting the layout of the sponsored results on the results page of a search
query. The main variable in the layout is the number of ads to display in the mainline,
i.e., above the organic search results, versus the sidebar, i.e., to the right of the organic
search results. Typical layouts include between zero and three advertisements in the
mainline, and up to six on the sidebar. The weights, which correspond to click proba-
bilities, depend on which of these four layout choices is selected. The optimal number
of ads to show on the mainline is distinct for each search query and our methods allow
these layouts to be optimized individually. Notice that the selection of the number of
mainline ads to show generalizes the opening example of selecting whether to sell one
or two units of an item.
The present paper refines the analysis of the estimator of Chawla et al. [2014]. The
previous paper bounded the error from estimating the k-unit auction revenue from the
bids in any position auction (for any k). As the revenue of any position auction is given
by a convex combination of multi-unit auction revenues, the error from estimating the
revenue of any position auction is bounded by the worst of these error bounds. The
present paper significantly improves the error bound of the estimator for the multi-
unit auction revenues and adapts the more sophisticated bounding method to directly
bound the error of an estimator for one position auction from the bids in another posi-
tion auction in terms of how close the former is to the latter. In particular, mechanism
B is close to A/B test mechanism C.
In an A/B test where mechanism C puts  probability on B (and 1 −  probability
on A), our error bounds have better dependence on  than ideal A/B testing. In ideal
A/B testing with a total of N bid samples, there are N samples from B. Thus, the
standard statistical error in estimating the revenue of B is O(1/
√
N) which is an 1/
√

dependence on . Our error bounds depend on  as log 1/, a significant improvement.
In particular, our methods give good bounds even when  < 1/N and the ideal A/B
test is unlikely to have ever run the B mechanism. The reason for this improvement is
that, while the ideal A/B test mechanism only sees N bids that depend on B, all bids
in the our A/B test mechanism C depend a little bid on the presence of B.
In terms of the number N of samples from the bid distribution our estimation meth-
ods achieve the optimal rate of
√
N , i.e., the mean absolute error is O(1/
√
N). When
the A/B test is employed not to estimate revenues but to determine whether to replace
incumbent auction A with novel auction B, the misclassification error is exponentially
small in N . For our application to advertising on Internet search engines, deciding the
number of ads to show on the mainline (between zero and four), again the misclassifi-
cation probability is exponentially small in N . The precise theorems given in the paper
give the dependence on the number of bidders in the auction and the fraction of traffic
sent to each of the A and B mechanisms.
Summary of Results. Our main results apply to first-price and all-pay position auc-
tions and are:
(1) We improve the analysis of Chawla et al. [2014] for the error in estimating the
revenue of a multi-unit auction from the bids in a position auction. (Section 3 and
Appendix C.)
(2) We give a direct analysis of the estimation of the revenue of B from the bids of
C which depends on the measure  on B in the support of C. The improvement of
(1) and this direct analysis enables the estimation of the revenue of B from C =
(1 − )A + B with logarithmic dependence on 1/ which allows good error bounds
even when  is exponentially small. (Section 5.1.)
(3) The logarithmic dependence on 1/ allows for a simple “universal B test”, a B mech-
anism that, when mixed with any A mechanism, allows the revenue of any other
position auction to be estimated. This universal B is a uniform mixture of the 1-
unit auction and the (n − 1)-unit auction. (The approach of Chawla et al. [2014]
was to mix uniformly over all multi-unit auctions.)
(4) If we do not wish to estimate revenues but only determine which of A or B will
achieve higher revenue, we give an estimator that is accurate with probability ap-
proaching 1 at an exponential rate in N , the number of observed bids from the A/B
test mechanism C. In comparison, estimation of the auction revenues has quadratic
rate. (Section 5.3.)
(5) We complement our theoretical analysis with simulation bounds that show that
our methods are indeed very practical. (Section 4.)
(6) We generalize the analysis to allow for the estimation of welfare. (Appendix B.)
Comparison to Global A/B Tests. Our A/B testing framework is motivated specif-
ically by the goal of optimizing an auction to local characteristics of the market in
which the auction is run. It is important to distinguish this goal from that of another
framework for A/B testing which is commonly used to evaluate global properties of
auctions across a collection of disjoint markets. This framework randomly partitions
the individual markets into a control group (where auction A is run) and a treatment
group (with auction B). From such an A/B test we can evaluate whether it is better for
all markets to run A or for all to run B. It cannot be used, however, for our motivat-
ing application of determining the number of mainline ads to show, where the optimal
number naturally varies across distinct markets. The work of Ostrovsky and Schwarz
[2011] on reserve pricing in Yahoo!’s ad auction demonstrates how such a global A/B
test can be valuable. They first used a parametric estimator for the value distribution
in each market to determine a good reserve price for that market. Then they did a
global A/B test to determine whether the auction with their calculated reserve prices
(the B mechanism) has higher revenue on average than the auction with the original
reserve prices (the A mechanism). Our methods relate to and can replace the first step
of their analysis.
Revenue versus Click Estimation. The primary focus of this paper and our discus-
sion thus far is on A/B testing of auctions when the details of the auction are known.
For our motivating application of position auctions when we vary the number of ads
shown on the mainline (a.k.a., the configuration), we assumed that the click-through
rates (a.k.a., position weights) of the positions for each configuration are known. These
weights are generally not known, and can also be estimated. Estimation of these
weights is much easier that estimating revenue and ideal A/B testing gives good esti-
mates.
The distinction between the revenue estimation and click-through rate estimation
problems is the following. Revenue is determined from bids that are submitted in ad-
vance of the partitioning choice of whether to run mechanism A or B; consequently,
the bids are not in equilibrium for either A or B but for their convex combination C.
Click-through rates arise from the behavior of the viewer of the search results page
and this viewer’s behavior is affected by the layout directly. Thus, while revenue must
be estimated via inference methods like ours, the click-through rates can be estimated
by ideal A/B testing.
In the separable model, where the click-through rates are exogenous to the layout
and, importantly, do not depend on which ads are shown,2 they can be estimated at the
same time as we A/B test the auction formats for revenue. Our estimators are linear in
the click-through rates; therefore, unbiased estimators for click-through rates can be
used in place of exact click-through rates and the resulting revenue estimates will be
unbiased. Furthermore, as the separable model posits that click rates are independent
from bids, estimation errors in click-through rates can be easily factored in to the error
of the revenue estimates.
The Generalized Second Price Auction. Our analysis does not extend to the general-
ized second price auction, i.e., to position auctions where each bidder pays the weighted
bid of the next highest bidder. The first two issues that arise for the generalized second
price auction are: (1) efficient symmetric equilibria may not exist [Gomes and Sweeney
2009]; (2) even when a symmetric equilibrium does exist, it may not be unique [Chawla
and Hartline 2013]. For these reasons there is not a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween position weights and the allocation rule of the mechanisms.
Even restricted to environments where a unique efficient symmetric Bayes-Nash
equilibrium exists, Bayes-Nash inference is challenging because bidder payments are
not a simple function of their bids and inverting the bid function is problematic. Specif-
ically, for the generalized first price auction, knowing the bid distribution exactly al-
lows one to obtain the value distribution via a formula that for any quantile maps the
bid and bid density at that quantile to the value at that quantile (see equation (3)). On
the other hand, for the generalized second price auction, estimating the value at some
quantile requires knowing the bid and the bid density not only at that same quantile,
but at all quantiles. Importantly, the function mapping bids to values is not linear in
the bids. This makes inference challenging, and can potentially lead to large errors.
Extending our methodology to this setting is an important open problem.
Related Work. Our work is motivated, in part, by field work in the past decade that
considers the empirical optimization of reserve prices in auctions (e.g., Reiley 2006;
Brown and Morgan 2009; and Ostrovsky and Schwarz 2011). The most notable of these
is the work of Ostrovsky and Schwarz [2011]. Ostrovsky and Schwarz [2011] adapt
their mechanism over time to respond to empirical data by determining the optimal
reserve price for the empirically observed distribution, and then setting a reserve price
that is slightly smaller. This allows for inference around the optimal reserve price and
ensures that the mechanism quickly adapts to changes in the distribution.
Prior to our previous work [Chawla et al. 2014], to our knowledge, the problem of in-
ferring parameters of one mechanism using observations drawn from another has not
been considered from a theoretical perspective. Other lines of work consider optimiz-
ing mechanisms based on samples from the value distribution (see Cole and Rough-
2Though inaccurate, this is one of the most standard models under which the search advertising auction is
studied.
garden 2014, and Fu et al. 2014); on the fly in one mechanism (see Goldberg et al.
2006, Segal 2003, and Baliga and Vohra 2003); or by repeatedly running auctions on
agents drawn from the same population, using multi-armed bandit based approaches
(see Kleinberg and Leighton 2003, Blum and Hartline 2005, and Cesa-Bianchi et al.
2015)). These works exclusively consider mechanisms that have truthtelling equilibria
and for which, consequently, inference is trivial.
Within econometrics literature, several recent works have developed techniques for
estimating the distribution of values from the distribution of bids of a given auction
(see, e.g., Guerre et al. [2000], Paarsch and Hong [2006], and Athey and Haile [2007]).
However, estimating parameters of one mechanism from the bids of another has not
been considered. While these inference approaches form the basis over which we de-
velop our methodology, our work shows that for certain quantities of interest such as
the multi-unit auction revenues or the ranking of revenues of different mechanisms,
we can bypass learning the underlying value distribution altogether, leading to better
convergence bounds.
2. PRELIMINARIES
A standard auction design problem is defined by a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of n ≥ 2 agents,
each with a private value vi for receiving a service. The values are bounded: vi ∈
[0, 1]; They are independently and identically distributed according to a continuous
distribution F . An auction elicits bids b = (b1, . . . , bn) from the agents and maps the
vector b of bids to an allocation x˜(b) = (x˜1(b), . . . , x˜n(b)), specifying the probability
with which each agent is served, and prices p˜(b) = (x˜1(b), . . . , x˜n(b)), specifying the
expected amount that each agent is required to pay. An auction is denoted by (x˜, p˜).
Standard payment formats. In this paper we study two standard payment formats.
In a first-price format, each agent pays his bid upon winning, that is, p˜i(b) = bi x˜i(b). In
an all-pay format, each agent pays his bid regardless of whether or not he wins, that
is, p˜i(b) = bi.
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The value distribution F is common knowledge to the
agents. A strategy si for agent i is a function that maps the value of the agent to
a bid. The distribution F and a profile of strategies s = (s1, · · · , sn) induces interim
allocation and payment rules (as a function of bids) as follows for agent i with bid bi.
x˜i(bi) = Ev−i∼F [x˜i(bi, s−i(v−i))] and p˜i(bi) = Ev−i∼F [p˜i(bi, s−i(v−i))] .
Agents have linear utility which can be expressed in the interm as:
u˜i(vi, bi) = vix˜i(bi)− p˜i(bi).
The strategy profile s forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) if for all agents i, values
vi, and alternative bids bi, bidding si(vi) according to the strategy profile is at least as
good as bidding bi. I.e.,
u˜i(vi, si(vi)) ≥ u˜i(vi, bi). (1)
A symmetric equilibrium is one where all agents bid by the same strategy, i.e., s
statisfies si = s for some s. For a symmetric equilibrium, the interim allocation and
payment rules are also symmetric, i.e., x˜i = x˜ and p˜i = p˜ for all i. For implicit distribu-
tion F and symmetric equilibrium given by strategy s, a mechanism can be described
by the pair (x˜, p˜).
The strategy profile allows the mechanism’s outcome rules to be expressed in terms
of the agents’ values instead of their bids; the distribution of values allows them to
be expressed in terms of the agents’ values relative to the distribution. This latter
representation exposes the geometry of the mechanism. Define the quantile q of an
agent with value v to be the probability that v is larger than a random draw from the
distribution F , i.e., q = F (v). Denote the agent’s value as a function of quantile as
v(q) = F−1(q), and his bid as a function of quantile as b(q) = s(v(q)). The outcome rule
of the mechanism in quantile space is the pair (x(q), p(q)) = (x˜(b(q)), p˜(b(q))).
Revenue curves and auction revenue. Myerson [1981] characterized Bayes-Nash
equilibria and this characteriation enables writing the revenue of a mechanism as a
weighted sum of revenues of single-agent posted pricings. Formally, the revenue curve
R(q) for a given value distribution specifies the revenue of the single-agent mechanism
that serves an agent with value drawn from that distribution if and only if the agent’s
quantile exceeds q: R(q) = v(q) (1− q). R(0) and R(1) are defined as 0. Myerson’s char-
acterization of BNE then implies that the expected revenue of a mechanism at BNE
from an agent facing an allocation rule x(q) can be written as follows:
Px = Eq[R(q)x′(q)] = −Eq[R′(q)x(q)] (2)
where x′ and R′ denote the derivative of x and R with respect to q, respectively.
The expected revenue of an auction is the sum over the agents of its per-agent ex-
pected revenue; for auctions with a symmetric equilibrium allocation rule x this rev-
enue is nPx.
Position environments. A position environment expresses the feasibility constraint
of the auction designer in terms of position weights w satisfying 1 ≥ w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥
wn ≥ 0. A position auction assigns agents (potentially randomly) to positions 1 through
n, and an agent assigned to position i gets allocated with probability wi. The rank-by-
bid position auction orders the agents by their bids, with ties broken randomly, and
assigns agent i, with the ith largest bid, to position i, with allocation probability wi.
Multi-unit environments are a special case and are defined for k units as wj = 1 for j ∈
{1, . . . , k} and wj = 0 for j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}. The highest-k-bids-win multi-unit auction
is the special case of the rank-by-bid position auction for the k-unit environment.
Rank-by-bid position auctions can be viewed as convex combinations of highest-
bids-win multi-unit auctions. The marginal weights of a position environment are
w′ = (w′1, . . . , w
′
n) with w′k = wk −wk+1. Define w′0 = 1−w1 and note that the marginal
weights w′ can be interpreted as a probability distribution over {0, . . . , n}. The rank-
by-bid position auction with weights w has the exact same allocation rule as the mech-
anism that draws a number of units k from the distribution given by w′ and runs the
highest-k-bids-win auction.
In our model with agent values drawn i.i.d. from a continuous distribution, rank-
by-bid position auctions with either all-pay or first-price payment semantics have a
unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium and this equilibrium is symmetric and efficient, i.e.,
in equilibrium, the agents’ bids and values are in the same order [Chawla and Hartline
2013]. Denote the highest-k-bids-win allocation rule as x(k:n) and its revenue as Pk =
Px(k:n) = Eq
[−R′(q)x(k:n)(q)]. This allocation rule is precisely the probability an agent
with quantile q has one of the highest k quantiles of n agents, or at most k − 1 of the
n− 1 remaining agents have quantiles greater than q. Formulaically,
x(k:n)(q) =
k−1∑
i=0
(
n−1
i
)
qn−1−i(1− q)i.
Importantly, the allocation rule of a rank-by-bid position auction does not depend on
the distribution at all. The allocation rule x of the rank-by-bid position auction with
weights w is:
x(q) =
∑
k
w′k x
(k:n)(q).
By revenue equivalence [Myerson 1981], the per-agent revenue of the rank-by-bid po-
sition auction with weights w is:
Px =
∑
k
w′k Pk.
Of course, P0 = Pn = 0 as always serving or never serving the agents gives zero
revenue.
Inference. The distribution of values, which is unobserved, can be inferred from the
distribution of bids, which is observed. This derivation is summarized by Lemma 2.1,
below. Interested readers can find a detailed derivation in Chawla et al. [2014] or Ap-
pendix A.
LEMMA 2.1. For an auction with first-price payment format, the value function v(·)
satisfies,
v(q) = b(q) + x(q) b
′(q)
x′(q) . (3)
For an auction with all-pay payment format, it satisfies,
v(q) = b
′(q)
x′(q) . (4)
Recall that the functions x(q) and x′(q) are known precisely for position auctions,
while functions b(q) and b′(q) are observed in the data and can be estimated.
Statistical Methods. The errors in the estimated bid distribution follow from stan-
dard analyses. For N draws from the bid distribution, define the estimated bid distri-
bution bˆ(·) as bˆ(q) = bˆi for all i ∈ N and q ∈ [i− 1, i)/N , where bˆi is the ith smallest bid
in the sample. For function b(·) and estimator bˆ(·), the uniform mean absolute error as
a function of the number of samples N is
E
[
supq
∣∣b(q)− bˆ(q)∣∣] .
The main object that will arise in our further analysis will be the weighted quantile
function of the bid distribution where the weights are determined by the allocation rule
of the auction under consideration. Our statistical results stem from the previous work
on the uniform convergence of quantile processes and weighted quantile processes in
Csorgo and Revesz [1978], Cso¨rgo¨ [1983], Cheng and Parzen [1997]. It turns out that
the our main object of interest for inference is the weighted quantile function of the bid
distribution. The weight is proportional to the inverse derivative of the allocation rule.
This feature leads to highly desirable proprties of the
√
N -normalized mean absolute
error, making it bounded by a universal constant.
LEMMA 2.2. The uniform mean absolute error of the empirical quantile function
bˆ(·) weighted by its derivative is bounded as follows, as N →∞.
E
[
supq
∣∣√N(b′(q))−1(b(q)− bˆ(q))∣∣] < 1.
This lemma along with Equation (3), and using the fact that values are bounded by
1 gives the following bound on the uniform mean absolute error of the weighted bid
distribution for the first-price auction as
E
[
supq
∣∣√N x(q)x′(q) (b(q)− bˆ(q)) ∣∣] ≤ 1.
Likewise, using Equation (4) for the all-pay auction, we get:
E
[
supq
∣∣√N(x′(q))−1 (b(q)− bˆ(q)) ∣∣] ≤ 1.
Equations (3) and (4) enable the value function, or equivalently, the value distribu-
tion, to be estimated from the estimated bid function and an estimator for the deriva-
tive of the bid function, or equivalently, the density of the bid distribution. Estimation
of densities is standard; however, it requires assumptions on the distribution, e.g., con-
tinuity, and the convergence rates in most cases will be slower. Our main results do
not take this standard approach.
3. INFERENCE METHODOLOGY AND ERROR BOUNDS FOR ALL-PAY AUCTIONS
We will now develop a methodology and error bounds for estimating the revenue of
one rank-based auction using bids from another rank-based auction. There are two
reasons behind our assumption that the auction that we run (that generates the ob-
served bids) is a rank-based auction. First, the allocation rule (in quantile space) of
a rank based auction is independent of the bid and value distribution; therefore, it is
known and does not need to be estimated. Second, the allocation rules that result from
rank-based auctions are well behaved, in particular their slopes are bounded, and our
error analysis makes use of this property.
Recall from Section 2 that the revenue of any rank-based auction can be expressed
as a linear combination of the multi-unit revenues P1, . . . , Pn with Pk equal to the per-
agent revenue of the highest-k-bids-win auction. Therefore, in order to estimate the
revenue of a rank-based auction, it suffices to estimate the Pks accurately.
In the following section we describe a function mapping the observed bids to the
revenue estimate. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we develop error bounds on our estimate for
the revenue of a multi-unit auction and a general position auction respectively.
3.1. Inference equation
Consider estimating the revenue of an auction with allocation rule y from the bids of
an all-pay position auction. The per-agent revenue of the allocation rule y is given by:
Py = Eq[y′(q)R(q)] = Eq[y′(q)v(q)(1− q)]
Let x denote the allocation rule of the auction that we run, and b denote the bid
distribution in BNE of this auction. Recall that for an all-pay auction format, we can
convert the bid distribution into the value distribution as follows: v(q) = b′(q)/x′(q).
Substituting this into the expression for Py above we get
Py = Eq
[
y′(q)(1− q) b
′(q)
x′(q)
]
= Eq[Zy(q)b′(q)] , where Zy(q) = (1− q)y
′(q)
x′(q)
.
This expression allows us to derive the revenue using the empirical bid distribution.
In Chawla et al. [2014] we observe that integration by parts yields an estimator that
is a simple weighted average of the empirical bid distribution.
LEMMA 3.1 (CHAWLA ET AL. [2014]). The per-agent revenue of a rank-based auc-
tion with allocation rule y can be written as a linear combination of the bids in an
all-pay auction:3
Py = Eq
[−Z ′y(q)b(q)]
where Zy(q) = (1 − q) y(q)x′(q) depends on the allocation rule x of the mechanism and is
known precisely.
Recall that the estimated bid distribution bˆ(·) is defined as a piecewise constant
function with N pieces. Thus, the estimator Pˆy = Eq[−Z ′y(q) bˆ(q)] can be simplified as
expressed in the following definition.
Definition 3.2. The estimator Pˆy for the revenue of an auction with allocation rule
y from N samples bˆ1 ≤ · · · ≤ bˆN from the equilibrium bid distribution of an auction
with allocation rule x is:
Pˆy =
N∑
i=1
[(
1− i− 1
N
)
y′( i−1N )
x′( i−1N )
−
(
1− i
N
)
y′( iN )
x′( iN )
]
bˆi (5)
3.2. Error bound for the multi-unit revenues
We will now develop an error bound for the estimator for Lemma 3.1 for the case of the
multi-unit revenues. In the following, denote the the allocation rule of the highest-k-
bids-win auction as xk (for an implicit number n of agents). We can therefore express
the error in the estimation of Pk in terms of the error in estimating the bid distribution.
|Pˆk − Pk| =
∣∣∣Eq[−Z ′k(q)(̂b(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣ (6)
In Chawla et al. [2014] we gave a simple but weak analysis of the error, obtaining
the following bound:
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
≤
√
2
N
sup
q
{x′(q)} sup
q
{
x′k(q)
x′(q)
}
To understand this error bound, we note that the maximum slope of the multi-
unit allocation rules xk, and therefore also that of any rank-based auction, is always
bounded by n, the number of agents in the auction (summarized as Fact D.1 in Ap-
pendix D). This bounds the supq x′(q) term. The quantity supq
{
x′k(q)
x′(q)
}
on the other
hand may be rather large, even unbounded, if x′(·) is near zero at some q. The approach
taken in Chawla et al. [2014] is to explicitly design x with position weight w′k >  (i.e.,
to mix xk into x) to ensure this latter term is bounded. We will now develop a stronger
bound on the error in Pk with better dependence on the quantity supq
{
x′k(q)
x′(q)
}
.
We start with Equation (6) and partition the expectation on the right hand side of
the equation as follows for some α > 0:
|Pˆk − Pk| =
∣∣∣Eq[−Z ′k(q)(̂b(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣
≤ Eq
[
(log(1 + Zk(q)))
α
Zk(q)
|Z ′k(q)|
]
sup
q
∣∣∣∣ Zk(q)(log(1 + Zk(q)))α (bˆ(q)− b(q))
∣∣∣∣
An appropriate choice of α gives us the following theorem. We defer the proof to the
appendix.
3Note that b(0) = 0 and Zk(1) = 0.
THEOREM 3.3. Let xk denote the allocation function of the k-highest-bids-win auc-
tion and x be the allocation function of any rank-based auction. Then for all k, the mean
squared error in estimating Pk from N samples from the bid distribution for an all-pay
auction with allocation rule x is bounded by:
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
≤ 40√
N
sup
q
{x′k(q)} log max
{
sup
q:x′k(q)≥1
x′(q)
x′k(q)
, sup
q
x′k(q)
x′(q)
}
.
Invoking Fact D.1, we note that the error in Pk given by Theorem 3.3 can be bounded
by
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
= O
(
n√
min{k, n− k}
)
1√
N
log max
{
sup
q:x′k(q)≥1
x′(q)
x′k(q)
, sup
q
x′k(q)
x′(q)
}
.
To understand the above error bound better, we make the following observations:
— When x = xk, we get an error bound of O(supq x′k(q)/
√
N), which is the same (within
constant factors) as the statistical error in bids.
— We also get a good error bound when x and xk are close enough without being iden-
tical: when x′k ≤ x′ ≤ x′k/, we get a bound of O(log(1/) supq x′k(q)/
√
N).
— Finally, as long as x′ ≥ x′k, that is, the highest-k-bids-win auction is mixed in with 
probability into x, we observe via Fact D.1 that supq:x′k(q)≥1 x
′(q)/x′k(q) ≤ supq x′(q) ≤
n, and obtain an error bound of O(log(n/) supq x′k(q)/
√
N).
3.3. Error bound for arbitrary rank-based revenues
We now develop an error bound for our estimator for the revenue, Py, of an arbitrary
position auction with allocation rule y from the bids of another position auction x. Let
us write y as a position auction with weights w:
y =
∑
k
w′k xk and Py =
∑
k
w′k Pk
Accordingly, the error in Py is bounded by a weighted sum of the error in Pk:
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆy − Py|
]
≤
∑
k
w′k Ebˆ
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
applying Theorem 3.3,
≤ 40√
N
∑
k
w′k sup
q
{x′k(q)}
(
log n+ log
1
w′k
+ log sup
q
y′(q)
x′(q)
)
= O
(
n log n√
N
log sup
q
y′(q)
x′(q)
)
(7)
Unfortunately, the above bound can be quite loose, as the following simple example
demonstrates. Suppose that x = y and w′k = 1/n for all k. Then the above approach
(via a tighter bound on the sum over k) leads to an error bound of O(
√
n log n/
√
N),
whereas, the true error bound should be O(1/
√
N), arising due to the statistical error
in bids. Furthermore, it is desirable to obtain an error bound that depends directly
on supq y′(q), rather than on the constituent supq x′k(q); the latter can be much larger
than the former. Below, we analyze the error in Py directly, leading to a slightly tighter
bound.
THEOREM 3.4. The expected absolute error in estimating the revenue of a position
auction with allocation rule y using N samples from the bid distribution for an all-pay
position auction with allocation rule x is bounded as below; here n is the number of
positions in the two position auctions.
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆy − Py|
]
≤ 40√
N
√
n log n sup
q
{y′(q)} log max
{
sup
q:y′(q)≥1
x′(q)
y′(q)
, sup
q
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
+
O(1)
N
sup
q
{x′(q)} sup
q
{
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
Note that the first term in the error bound in Theorem 3.4 dominates, and this term
is identical to the bound in Theorem 3.3, except for an extra
√
n log n term. Moreover,
when supq y′(q) <
√
n, Theorem 3.4 gives us a tighter error bound than Equation (7).
We will now prove the theorem. Here we provide an outline for the proof; the complete
argument can be found in the appendix.
PROOF SKETCH: As for the multi-unit revenues,
|Pˆy − Py| =
∣∣∣Eq[Zy(q)(̂b′(q)− b′(q))]∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Eq[Z ′y(q)(̂b(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣
In order to simplify our analysis of the error in Py, we will break up the error into
two components: the bias in the estimator Pˆy and the deviation of Pˆy from its mean.
|Pˆy − Py| ≤
∣∣∣Pˆy −E[Pˆy]∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣E[Pˆy]− Py∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Eq[Z ′y(q)(̂b(q)− b˜(q))]∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Eq[Z ′y(q)(b˜(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣ (8)
Here, b˜ is a step function that equals the expectation of the empirical bid function b̂:
b˜(q) = E
[
b̂(q)
]
The bias of the estimator Pˆ (i.e. the second term in (8)) is easy to bound. We prove
in the appendix that b˜(q) − b(q) is at most O(1)/N times supq{x′(q)}. This implies the
following lemma.
LEMMA 3.5. With b˜ defined as above,∣∣∣E[Pˆy]− Py∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Eq[Z ′y(q)(b˜(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣ = O(1)N supq {x′(q)} supq
{
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
.
We now focus on the first term in (8), namely the integral over the quantile axis of
Z ′y(q)(̂b(q)− b˜(q)). The approach of Section 3.2 does not provide a good upper bound on
this quantity, because a counterpart of Lemma D.2 (see Appendix D) fails to hold for
Zy. Instead, we will express the integral as a sum over several independent terms, and
show that it is small in expectation.
To this end, we first identify the set of quantiles at which the function b̂ “crosses” the
function b˜ from below. This set is defined inductively. Define i0 = 0. Then, inductively,
let i` be the smallest integer strictly greater than i`−1 such that
b̂
(
i` − 1
N
)
≤ b˜
(
i` − 1
N
)
and b̂
(
i`
N
)
> b˜
(
i`
N
)
.
Let ik−1 be the last integer so defined, and let ik = N . Let I denote the set of indices
{i0, · · · , ik}. Let Ti,j denote the following integral:
Ti,j =
∫ q=j/N
q=i/N
Z ′y(q)(̂b(q)− b˜(q)) dq
Then, our goal is to bound the quantity Ebˆ[|T0,N |] where T0,N can be written as the
sum:
T0,N =
`=k−1∑
`=0
Ti`,i`+1 .
We now claim that conditioned on I and the maximum bid error, this is a sum over
independent random variables. In the following, let G denote the bid distribution, and
Gˆ the empirical bid distribution.
LEMMA 3.6. Conditioned on the set of indices I and ∆ = supq |Gˆ(b(q)) − G(b(q))|,
over the randomness in the bid sample, the random variables Ti`,i`+1 are mutually
independent.
Then we apply Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds, coupled with the approach from Sec-
tion 3.2 to bound each individual Ti`,i`+1 , to obtain a bound on the proability that
Ebˆ[|T0,N | | I,∆] exceeds some value a > 0.
LEMMA 3.7. With I = {i0, · · · , ik} and Ti,j defined as above, for any a > 0,
Pr [|T0,N | ≥ a | I,∆] ≤ exp
(
− a
2
n(40∆C)2
)
, where C = sup
q
{y′(q)} log max
{
sup
q:y′(q)≥1
x′(q)
y′(q)
, sup
q
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
.
Combining this lemma with an absolute bound on |T0,N |, and removing the condition-
ing on I and ∆, we obtain the Theorem 3.4.
4. SIMULATION EVIDENCE
We now present some simulation evidence to support our theoretical results. Our focus
will be the inference of the revenue of a position auction B using bid data from mixed
auction C = (1 − ) A+B where A is another position auction. Recall that xA denotes
the allocation rule of A, xB the allocation rule of B, and xC(q) = (1− )xA(q) +  xB(q)
is the allocation rule of C.
We consider the following three designs.
—Design 1: Auction A is the one-unit auction, xA(q) = qn−1; and auction B is the
uniform-stair position auction, xB(q) = q.
—Design 2: Auction A is the uniform-stair position auction, xA(q) = q; and Auction B
is the one-unit auction, xB(q) = qn−1
—Design 3: Auction A is the (n− 1)-unit auction, xA(q) = 1− (1− q)n−1; and auction
B is the one-unit auction, xB(q) = qn−1.
The uniform-stair position auction is given by position weights w with wk = n−kn−1 for
each k. For each design, the values of the bidders are drawn the beta distribution with
parameters α = β = 2. This distribution of values is supported on [0, 1]; it is unimodal
with the mode and the mean at 1/2 and it is symmetric about the mean.
Methodology
We perform simulations to calculate the mean absolute deviation of our estimator PˆB
for the revenue of auction B with its expected revenue PB . The allocation rules xB
Design 1: xA(q) = x
(1:n)(q) and xB(q) = q.
n = N = Theorem 4.5
2 101 102 103 104 105 upper bound
22 1.2534 0.3874 0.3625 0.3573 0.3535 0.3481 5.4221
23 0.3915 0.4336 0.4829 0.4994 0.5041 0.4918 4.6957
24 0.3025 0.3634 0.3982 0.4045 0.4088 0.4187 4.6166
25 0.1831 0.2690 0.2825 0.2821 0.2798 0.2901 4.5622
26 0.1437 0.2369 0.1929 0.1917 0.1898 0.1890 4.2406
27 0.1316 0.1902 0.1590 0.1432 0.1407 0.1441 3.7786
28 0.1276 0.1462 0.1490 0.1248 0.1226 0.1198 3.2644
29 0.1247 0.1267 0.1488 0.1207 0.1100 0.1150 2.7543
210 0.1215 0.1176 0.1616 0.1165 0.1114 0.1124 0.5702
Design 2: xA(q) = q and xB(q) = x
(1:n)(q).
n = N = Theorem 4.5
2 101 102 103 104 105 upper bound
22 0.1416 0.0716 0.0586 0.0589 0.0578 0.0590 9.2103
23 0.1281 0.0789 0.0637 0.0643 0.0670 0.0624 9.2103
24 0.0790 0.0821 0.0596 0.0584 0.0591 0.0583 9.2103
25 0.0427 0.0687 0.0488 0.0472 0.0452 0.0490 9.2103
26 0.0224 0.0483 0.0369 0.0337 0.0337 0.0355 9.2103
27 0.0116 0.0259 0.0290 0.0237 0.0232 0.0236 9.2103
28 0.0059 0.0132 0.0230 0.0162 0.0157 0.0156 9.2103
29 0.0030 0.0067 0.0186 0.0115 0.0107 0.0104 9.2103
210 0.0015 0.0034 0.0107 0.0094 0.0084 0.0081 9.2103
Design 3: xA(q) = x
(n−1:n)(q) and xB(q) = x(1:n)(q).
n = N = Theorem 4.5
2 101 102 103 104 105 upper bound
22 0.1522 0.1978 0.2127 0.2104 0.2113 0.2101 9.2103
23 0.1177 0.1200 0.1061 0.1056 0.1064 0.0998 9.2103
24 0.0759 0.1116 0.1067 0.1046 0.1019 0.1029 9.2103
25 0.0424 0.0866 0.0817 0.0798 0.0809 0.0800 9.2103
26 0.0224 0.0499 0.0604 0.0602 0.0604 0.0581 9.2103
27 0.0116 0.0259 0.0474 0.0443 0.0434 0.0447 9.2103
28 0.0059 0.0132 0.0356 0.0323 0.0324 0.0322 9.2103
29 0.0030 0.0067 0.0209 0.0226 0.0226 0.0235 9.2103
210 0.0015 0.0034 0.0107 0.0171 0.0168 0.0161 9.2103
Fig. 1. Mean absolute deviation for P̂B across Monte-Carlo simulations normalized by
√
N/n.
and xC , their derivatives x′B and x′C , and the revenue curve R are calculated analyt-
ically. The expected revenue PB is calculated from the revenue curve R and x′B by
equation (2) via numerical integration (i.e., by averaging the values of R(q)x′B(q) on
a grid). The equilibrium bids in auction C for values on a uniform grid are calculated
from equation (4) via numerical integration on a grid. Each simulation draws N bids
from this set of bids with replacement, the estimated revenue PˆB is calculated from
Definition 3.2, and the mean absolute deviation is calculated by averaging |PB − PˆB |
over 1000 Monte Carlo simulations.
Results and observations
Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 give the following upper bounds on the mean absolute deviation
of our revenue estimator for the three designs considered above:
—Design 1: 40
√
n logn√
N
log max
(
n, 1
)
+O
(
n
N
)
.
—Design 2: 40n√
N
log 1 .
—Design 3: 40n√
N
log 1 .
In Figure 1 we report our empirically observed mean absolute error in revenue for
each of the three designs; the auction mixture is set as  = .001 and parameters n
and N are varied. In order to discern the dependence of the error on N and n, the
values in Figure 1 are normalized by the factor
√
N/n. By replicating the Monte Carlo
sampling we ensured that the Monte Carlo sample size leads to the relative error of at
most 6%. The last column of the table reports the values of the above bounds for the
corresponding parameter values.
Fig. 2. Dependence of the relative median absolute error from the mixture weight .
We make the following observations:
—Dependence on N : Per our theoretical bound and normalization, we expect the
values reported in the table to stay constant across different numbers of samples N .
The table validates this: for all three designs, values along the rows in the table do
not vary significantly.
—Dependence on n: Per our theoretical bound and normalization, we expect the
values reported in the table to increase slowly with n (logarithmically for Design 1,
and sublinearly for Designs 2 and 3). We observe instead that values decrease with
n (along columns in the table). This indicates that the dependence of our theoretical
upper bound on n is loose and the true dependence of error on n is much smaller.
— The table also directly contrasts the empirical performance of our estimator with
the theoretical upper bound given in Theorem 4.5. The bound exceeds the measured
mean absolute error, suggesting that it can be tightened further.
To illustrate the dependence of the estimation error on the choice of the mixture
weight  for the three considered designs. We fix the number of agents n = 32 and the
sample size N = 1000 and vary mixture probability  between 0 an 1, exclusive. In Fig-
ure 2 we demonstrate the dependence of the median absolute error computed as the
ratio of the median absolute error to estimated revenue. The figure demonstrates that
for Designs 1 and 3, error decreases or remains constant as  increases. This is consis-
tent with our theoretical bound. On the other hand, for Design 2, after a small initial
decrease, the error surprisingly increases with . This increase is not directly captured
by our theoretical bound.4 Intuitively, the auction A in Design 2 is much better for
inferring the revenue of B than B itself, because the bid distribution it generates has
high density on its entire range.
5. APPLICATIONS TO A/B TESTING
We now discuss applications of the inference approach we developed in Section 3.
4Our theoretical bound nevertheless applies at all values of ; the seeming discrepancy arises because rela-
tive to the actual error, our bound is looser for small  than for large .
5.1. Estimating revenues of novel mechanisms
Recall the setting of an ideal A/B test: an auction house running auction A and want-
ing to determine the revenue of a novel mechanism B mixes in the auction B with
some probability  > 0. Suppose that in doing so, the auction house obtains N bids in
response to the auction B out of a total of N bids, the revenue of B can be estimated
within an error bound of
Θ
(
1√

)
supq{x′B(q)}√
N
. (9)
In practice, however, instead of obtaining bids in response to B alone, the seller obtains
bids in response to the aggregate mechanism C = (1 − )A + B. We can then use (5)
to estimate the revenue of B. As a consequence of Theorem 3.4, and noting that for
positions auctions with n positions, x′C(q) ≤ n and x′B(q)/x′C(q) ≤ 1/ for all quantiles
q, we obtain the following error bound.
COROLLARY 5.1. The revenue of a rank based mechanism B can be estimated from
N bids of a rank-based mechanism C = (1− )A+ B with absolute error bounded by
O(1)
√
n log n log(n/)
supq{x′B(q)}√
N
. (10)
Relative to the ideal situation described above, our error bound has a better depen-
dence on  and a worse dependence on n. Note that when  is very small, our error
bound (10) may be smaller than the ideal bound in (9). This is not surprising: the ideal
bound ignores information that we can learn about the revenue of B from the (1− )N
bids obtained when B is not run.
When B is a multi-unit auction, we obtain a better error bound using Theorem 3.3
which is closer to the ideal bound in (9).
COROLLARY 5.2. The revenue of the highest-k-bids-win mechanism B can be esti-
mated from N bids of a rank-based mechanism C = (1 − )A + B with absolute error
bounded by
40 log(n/)
supq{x′B(q)}√
N
. (11)
5.2. Universal B test
We now consider the problem of estimating all of the multi-unit revenues Pk simulta-
neously from the bids of a single auction. What properties should the auction C have
in order to enable this? The following definition formalizes this notion.
Definition 5.3. An auction B is a universal B test if for any rank-based auction A,
any  > 0, and auction C defined by xC = (1− )xA+ xB ; all of the multi-unit revenues
P1, . . . , Pn can be estimated from bids of C with the dependence of the absolute error
on  bounded by O(log(1/)).
In Chawla et al. [2014] we showed that it suffices to mix the k-unit auction for every k
into C with some small probability. In other words, the position auction B with position
weights wk = 1 − k/n is a universal B test. We will now prove that in fact we can
get similar results by mixing in just a few of the multi-unit auctions. In particular,
in order to estimate Pk accurately, it suffices to mix in a multi-unit auction with no
more than k units, and another one with no less than k units. This gives us a more
efficient universal B test for simultaneously inferring all of the multi-unit revenues
(see Corollary 5.5).
LEMMA 5.4. The revenue of the highest-k-bids-win mechanism B can be estimated
from N bids of a rank-based all-pay auction C = (1 − 2)A +B1 + B2 where A is an
arbitrary rank-based auction, and B1 and B2 are the highest-k1-bids-win and highest-
k2-bids-win auctions respectively, with k1 ≤ k ≤ k2. The absolute error of the estimate
is bounded by
40(n+ log(1/))
supq{x′k(q)}√
N
.
PROOF. We begin by noting that for any j and k with k ≤ j,
x′k(q)
x′j(q)
=
(
j−1
k−1
)(
n−1−k
n−1−j
) ( q
1− q
)j−k
.
When k ≤ j and q ≥ 1/2, this ratio is less than 2n. Likewise, we can show that when
k ≥ j and q ≤ 1/2, the ratio x′k(q)x′j(q) is less than 2
n. Therefore, for any q, and C = (1 −
2)A +B1 + B2 where B1 and B2 are the highest-k1-bids-win and highest-k2-bids-win
auctions respectively, with k1 ≤ k ≤ k2, we have
x′k(q)
x′C(q)
≤ 1

2n.
Next we note that supq x′C(q) ≤ n, and therefore, supq:x′k(q)≥1
x′C(q)
x′k(q)
≤ n. Putting these
quantities together with Theorem 3.3, we get that the absolute error in estimating Pk
from bids drawn from C is at most
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
≤ 40√
N
sup
q
{x′k(q)} (n+ log 1/) .
COROLLARY 5.5. Let B be the position auction with position weights w1 = 1, wk =
1/2 for 1 < k < n − 1, and wn = 0. Then N bids from a mechanism C with xC = (1 −
)xA + xB , where A is an arbitrary rank-based auction, can be used to simultaneously
estimate all of the multi-unit revenues, and consequently all position auction revenues
with absolute error bounded by
40n(n+ log(1/))√
N
.
5.3. Comparing revenues
We have considered the case where the empirical task was to recover the revenues for
one mechanism (y) using the sample of bids responding to another mechanism (x). In
many practical situations the empirical task is simply the verification of whether the
revenue from a given mechanism is higher than the revenue from another mechanism.
Or, equivalently, the task could be to verify whether one mechanism provides revenue
which is a certain percentage above that of another mechanism. We now demonstrate
that this is a much easier empirical task in terms of accuracy than the task of inferring
the revenue.
Suppose that we want to compare the revenues of mechanisms B1 and B2 by mixing
them in to an incumbent mechanism A, and running the composite mechanism C =
B1 + B2 + (1− 2)A. Specifically, we would like to determine whether PB1 > αPB2 for
some α > 0. Consider a binary classifier γ̂ which is equal to 1 when PB1 > αPB2 and
0 otherwise. Let γ = 1{PB1 − αPB2 > 0} be the corresponding “ideal” classifier for the
case where the distribution of bids from mechanism C is known precisely. To evaluate
the accuracy of the classifier, we need to evaluate the probability Pr(γ̂ = 1|γ = 0), and
likewise, Pr(γ̂ = 0|γ = 1). The classifier will give the wrong output if the sampling
noise in estimating PˆB1 − α PˆB2 is greater than |PB1 − αPB2 |.
Our main result of this section says that keeping α, the difference |PB1 − αPB2 |,
and the number of positions n constant, the probability of incorrect output decreases
exponentially with the number of bids N . See Appendix D for a proof.
THEOREM 5.6. Suppose that N bids from a mechanism C = B1 + B2 + (1− 2)A
for arbitrary rank-based mechanisms B1, B2, and A, are used to estimate the classifier
γ = 1{PB1 − αPB2 > 0} that establishes whether the revenue of mechanism B1 exceeds
α times the revenue of mechanism B2. Then the error rate of the binary classifier is
bounded from above by
exp
(
−O
(
Na2
α2n3 log(n/)
))
,
where a = |PB1 − αPB2 |. In other words, once the number of samples is polynomially
large in n, the error rate decreases exponentially with the number of samples.
We obtain a similar error bound when our goal is to estimate which of r different
novel mechanisms obtains the most revenue, for any r > 1:
COROLLARY 5.7. Suppose that our goal is to determine which of r position auctions,
B1, B2, · · · , Br, obtains the most revenue while running incumbent mechanism A, by
running each of the novel mechanisms with probability /r. Then the error probability
of the corresponding classifier constructed using N bids from composite mechanism
C =
∑r
i=1 /rBi + (1− )A is bounded from above by
r exp
(
−O
(
Na2
n3 log(rn/)
))
,
where a is the absolute difference between the revenue obtained by the best two of the r
mechanisms.
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A. INFERENCE FOR AUCTIONS
The distribution of values, which is unobserved, can be inferred from the distribution
of bids, which is observed. Once the value distribution is inferred, other properties of
the value distribution such as its corresponding revenue curve, which is fundamental
for optimizing revenue, can be obtained. In this section we describe the basic premise
of the inference assuming that the distribution of bids known exactly.
The key idea behind the inference of the value distribution from the bid distribution
is that the strategy which maps values to bids is a best response, by equation (1),
to the distribution of bids. As the distribution of bids is observed, and given suitable
continuity assumptions, this best response function can be inverted.
The value distribution can be equivalently specified by distribution function F (·) or
value function v(·); the bid distribution can similarly be specified by the bid function
b(·). For rank-based auctions (as considered by this paper) the allocation rule x(·) in
quantile space is known precisely (i.e. it does not depend on the value function v(·)).
Assume these functions are monotone, continuously differentiable, and invertible.
Inference for first-price auctions. Consider a first-price rank-based auction with a
symmetric bid function b(q) and allocation rule x(q) in BNE. To invert the bid function
we solve for the bid that the agent with any quantile would make. Continuity of this
bid function implies that its inverse is well defined. Applying this inverse to the bid
distribution gives the value distribution.
The utility of an agent with quantile q as a function of his bid z is
u(q, z) = (v(q)− z)x(b−1(z)). (12)
Differentiating with respect to z we get:
d
dzu(q, z) = −x(b−1(z)) +
(
v(q)− z)x′(b−1(z)) ddz b−1(z).
Here x′ is the derivative of x with respect to the quantile q. Because b(·) is in BNE, the
derivative ddzu(q, z) is 0 at z = b(q). Rarranging, we obtain:
v(q) = b(q) + x(q) b
′(q)
x′(q)
Inference for all-pay auctions. We repeat the calculation above for rank-based all-
pay auctions; the starting equation (12) is replaced with the analogous equation for
all-pay auctions:
u(q, z) = v(q)x(b−1(z))− z. (13)
Differentiating with respect to z we obtain:
d
dzu(q, z) = v(q)x
′(b−1(z))
d
dz
b−1(z)− 1,
Again the first-order condition of BNE implies that this expression is zero at z = b(q);
therefore,
v(q) = b
′(q)
x′(q) .
Known and observed quantities. Recall that the functions x(q) and x′(q) are known
precisely: these are determined by the rank-based auction definition. The functions
b(q) and b′(q) are observed. The calculations above hold in the limit as the number of
samples from the bid distribution goes to infinity, at which point these obserations are
precise.
B. INFERENCE FOR SOCIAL WELFARE
We now consider the problem of estimating the social welfare of a rank-based auction
using bids from another rank-based all-pay auction. Consider a rank-based auction
with induced position weights w. By definition, the expected per-agent social welfare
obtained by this auction is as below, where Vk is the expected value of the kth highest
value agent, or the kth order statistic of the value distribution.
Sw =
1
n
n∑
k=1
wkVk
We note that the value order statistics, Vk, are closely related to the expected rev-
enues of the multi-unit auctions. The k-unit second-price auction serves the top k
agents with probability 1, and charges each agent the k + 1th highest value. Its ex-
pected revenue is therefore nPk = kVk+1. We therefore obtain:
Sw = w1
V1
n
+
n−1∑
k=1
wk+1
Pk
k
The methodology developed in the previous sections can be used to estimate the Pk ’s
in the above expression. The first order statistic of the values, V1, cannot be directly
estimated in this manner. Notate the expected value of an agent as
V = Eq[v(q)] = 1
n
n∑
k=1
Vk
where V is the expected value of any one agent. Therefore, we can calculate the social
welfare of the position auction with weights w as
Sw = w1V −
n∑
k=2
(w1 − wk)Vk
n
= w1V −
n−1∑
k=1
(w1 − wk+1) Pk
k
(14)
We now argue that V can be estimated at a good rate from the bids of another rank-
based all-pay auction. Let x denote the allocation rule of the auction that we run, and
b denote the bid distribution in BNE of this auction. Then we note that
V = Eq[v(q)] = Eq
[
b′(q)
x′(q)
]
= Eq
[−Z¯ ′(q)b(q)]
where Z¯(q) = 1/x′(q). We might now try to directly apply Theorem 3.3 to bound the
error in our estimate of V. This does not work, as Lemma D.2 fails to hold for Z¯. In-
stead, we can follow the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.4 and obtain the following
lemma:
LEMMA B.1. The expected absolute error in estimating the expected value V using
N samples from the bid distribution for an all-pay position auction with allocation rule
x is bounded as below; Here n is the number of positions in the position auction.
Ebˆ
[
|Vˆ − V|
]
≤ 40√
N
√
n log n log max
{
supq x
′(q), supq
1
x′(q)
}
+ O(1)N supq{x′(q)} supq
{
1
x′(q)
}
As an example application of Lemma B.1, we adapt Corollary 5.5 to bound the error
of from estimating the social welfare of any position auction that is mixed with the
universal B test mechanism of Section 5.2. Other revenue estimation results can be
similarly adapted to estimate social welfare.
THEOREM B.2. Let B be the position auction with position weights w1 = 1, wk = 1/2
for 1 < k < n− 1, and wn = 0. Then N bids from a mechanism C with xC = (1− )xA +
xB , where A is an arbitrary rank-based auction, can be used to simultaneously estimate
the per-agent social welfare of any rank-based mechanism with absolute error bounded
by
40n log n(n+ log(1/))√
N
+
40
√
n log n log(n/)√
N
+O
( n
N
)
= O
(
n log n(n+ log(1/))√
N
)
+O
( n
N
)
.
The theorem follows by combining Lemma B.1 with equation (14) and Corollary 5.5.
In the statement of the theorem the error term corresponding to the Pk ’s has an extra
factor of log n (relative to the statement of Corollary 5.5) because the total weight of
the multipliers for the terms in equation (14) can be as large as log n.
C. INFERENCE METHODOLOGY AND ERROR BOUNDS FOR FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS
While most of our analysis so far has focused on the case of all-pay auctions, our
methodology and results extend as-is to first-price auctions as well. Here we sketch
the differences between the two cases.
Recall that in a first-price auction, we can obtain the value distribution from the bid
distribution as follows: v(q) = b(q) + x(q)b′(q)/x′(q). Substituting this into the expres-
sion for Py we get:
Py = Eq
[
(1− q)y′(q)b(q) + (1− q)y
′(q)x(q)b′(q)
x′(q)
]
= Eq[(1− q)y′(q)b(q) + Zy(q)x(q)b′(q)]
where, as before, Zy(q) = (1−q)y
′(q)
x′(q) .
Integrating the second expression by parts, we get∫ 1
0
Zy(q)x(q)b
′(q) dq = Zy(q)x(q)b(q)|10 −
∫ 1
0
(Z ′y(q)x(q) + Zy(q)x
′(q))b(q) dq
= −
∫ 1
0
Z ′y(q)x(q)b(q) dq −
∫ 1
0
(1− q)y′(q)b(q) dq
When we put this back in the expression for Py two of the terms cancel, and we get
the following lemma.
LEMMA C.1. The per-agent revenue of an auction with allocation rule y can be writ-
ten as a linear combination of the bids in a first-pay auction:
Py = Eq
[−x(q)Z ′y(q)b(q)]
where Zy(q) = (1− q) y
′(q)
x′(q) and x(q) are known precisely.
As in the case of the all-pay auction format, we can write the error in Py as:
|Pˆy − Py| = Eq
[∣∣∣−x(q)Z ′y(q)(̂b(q)− b(q))∣∣∣]
≤ E
[
(log(1 + Zy(q)))
α
Zy(q)
|Z ′y(q)|
]
sup
q
∣∣∣∣x(q) Zy(q)(log(1 + Zy(q)))α (bˆ(q)− b(q))
∣∣∣∣
With an appropriate choice of α we obtain the following theorem.
THEOREM C.2. The expected absolute error in estimating the revenue of a position
auction with allocation rule y using N samples from the bid distribution for a first-pay
position auction with allocation rule x is bounded as below; Here n is the number of
positions in the two position auctions.
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆy − Py|
]
≤ 40√
N
√
n log n sup
q
{y′(q)} log max
{
sup
q:y′(q)≥1
x′(q)
y′(q)
, sup
q
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
+
O(1)
N
sup
q
{x′(q)} sup
q
{
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
.
When y is the highest-k-bids-win allocation rule, the error improves to:
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
≤ 40√
N
sup
q
{x′k(q)} log max
{
sup
q:x′k(q)≥1
x′(q)
x′k(q)
, sup
q
x′k(q)
x′(q)
}
.
Because the error bounds in Theorem C.2 are identical to those in Theorems 3.3 and
3.4, Lemma 5.4, Corollaries 5.1, 5.2, 5.5, and Theorems 5.6 and B.2 continue to hold
when bids are drawn from a first-price auction.
D. MISSING PROOFS
FACT D.1. The maximum slope of the allocation rule x of any n-agent position auc-
tion is bounded by n: supq x′(q) ≤ n. The maximum slope of the allocation rule xk for
the n-agent highest-k-bids-win auction is bounded by
sup
q
x′k(q) ∈
[
1√
2pi
,
1√
pi
]
n− 1√
min{k − 1, n− k} = Θ
(
n√
min{k, n− k}
)
.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3. We will make use of the following lemma from Chawla et al.
[2014].
LEMMA D.2 (CHAWLA ET AL. [2014] ). Let xk denote the allocation function of the
k-highest-bids-win auction and x be any convex combination over the allocation func-
tions of the multi-unit auctions. Then the function Zk(q) = (1− q)x
′
k(q)
x′(q) achieves a single
local maximum for q ∈ [0, 1].
Recall that for α > 0 we can write5
|Pˆk − Pk| ≤ E
[
(log(1 + Zk(q)))
α
Zk(q)
|Z ′k(q)|
]
sup
q
∣∣∣∣ Zk(q)(log(1 + Zk(q)))α (bˆ(q)− b(q))
∣∣∣∣
We start by considering the first term. Lemma D.2 shows that Z ′k(·) changes sign only
once. Consider the region where the sign of Z ′k(·) is constant and make the change of
variable t = Zk(q). Recall that Z∗k = supq Zk(q) and we note that infq Zk(q) ≥ 0. Then
we can evaluate the first term as
E
[
(log(1 + Zk(q)))
α
Zk(q)
|Z ′k(q)|
]
≤ 2
∫ Z∗k
0
(log (1 + t))α
t
dt
Note that for any t > 0, log(1 + t) ≤ t. Thus,∫ δ
0
(log (1 + t))α
t
dt <
δα
α
5In this entire proof the logarithms are natural logarithms.
Now split the integral into two pieces as∫ Z∗k
0
(log (1 + t))α
t
dt =
∫ 1
0
(log (1 + t))α
t
dt+
∫ Z∗k
1
(log (1 + t))α
t
dt
We just proved that the first piece is at most 1/α. Now we upper bound the second
piece and consider the integrand at t ≥ 1. First, note that
(log (1 + t))α =
(
log t+ log(1 +
1
t
)
)α
≤
(
log t+
1
t
)α
≤ (log t+ 1)α.
Thus, the integral behaves as∫ Z∗k
1
(log (1 + t))α
t
dt ≤
∫ Z∗k
1
(log (t) + 1)α
t
dt =
1
1 + α
(log Z∗k + 1)
1+α.
Thus, we just showed that
E
[
(log(1 + Zk(q)))
α
Zk(q)
|Z ′k(q)|
]
≤ 2
α
+
2
1 + α
(log Z∗k + 1)
1+α,
which is at most 2(1 + e)/α for α < 1/ log Z∗k .
Now consider the term
sup
q
∣∣∣∣ Zk(q)(log(1 + Zk(q)))α (bˆ(q)− b(q))
∣∣∣∣
Note that log(1 + t) ≥ min{1, t}/2. So the first term can be bounded from above as
Zk(q)
(log(1 + Zk(q)))
α ≤ 2α max
{
Zk(q), (Zk(q))
1−α}
The second term behaves as
(bˆ(q)− b(q)) = −x′(q)v(q)(Gˆ(b(q))−G(b(q)))
where G and Gˆ are the real and empirical bid distributions, respectively. We recall that
E
[
supq
∣∣∣Gˆ(b(q))−G(b(q))∣∣∣] ≤ 1
2
√
N
. Thus
E
[
sup
q
∣∣∣∣ Zk(q)(log(1 + Zk(q)))α (bˆ(q)− b(q))
∣∣∣∣] ≤ 2α sup
q
(
max
{
x′k(q), (x
′
k(q))
1−α(x′(q))α
}) 1
2
√
N
≤ 2α sup
q
(x′k(q))
max
(
1, sup
q:x′k(q)≥1
x′(q)
x′k(q)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:A

α
1
2
√
N
Now we combine the two evaluations together and pick α = min{1/ logA, 1/ logZ∗k},
with A defined as above, to obtain
E
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
≤ 2(1 + e)
α
2αAα
1
2
√
N
sup
q
(x′k(q))
≤ 20√
N
sup
q
{x′k(q)} max
{
logA, log sup
q
{
x′k(q)
x′(q)
}}
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.5. We can write the function b˜(i/N) as
b˜
(
i
N
)
=
N !
(i− 1)!(N − i)!
∫
G(t)i−1(1−G(t))N−ig(t)t dt
=
N !
(i− 1)!(N − i)!
∫
ti−1(1− t)N−ib(t) dt
Note that
N !
(i− 1)!(N − i)! t
i−1(1− t)N−i
is the density of the beta-distribution with parameters α = i and β = N − i+ 1. Denote
this density f(t;α, β). Then we can write
b˜
(
i
N
)
=
∫ 1
0
b(t)f(t;α, β) dt.
Now let q ∈ [i/N, (i+ 1)/N ], and consider an expansion of b(t) at q such that
b(t) = b(q) + b′(q)(t− q) +O((t− q)2)
Now we substitute this expansion into the formula for b˜(·) above to get
b˜
(
i
N
)
= b(q) + b′(q)
∫ 1
0
(t− q)f(t;α, β) dt+O(
∫ 1
0
(t− q)2f(t;α, β) dt)
The mean of the beta distribution is α/(α+β) and the variance is αβ/((α+β)2(α+β+1)).
This means that
b˜
(
i
N
)
− b(q) = b′(q)
(
i
N + 1
− q
)
+O
(
1
N2
)
.
Thus
sup
q∈[i/N,(i+1)/N ]
∣∣∣∣b˜( iN
)
− b(q)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
q
b′(q)
2
N
+O
(
1
N2
)
.
Therefore, the expectation
∣∣∣Pˆy −E[Pˆy]∣∣∣ is at most O(1)/N supq{x′(q)} supq Zy(q).
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.6. Fix I and `, and note that the function b˜ is fixed (that is, it
does not depend on the empirical bid sample). Then, the sum Ti`,i`+1 depends only
on the empirical bid values b̂(q) for quantiles in the interval [i`/N, i`+1/N). By the
definition of I, we know that the smallest i` bids in the sample are all smaller than
b˜((i` − 1)/N) ≤ b˜(i`/N), and the largest N − i`+1 bids in the sample are all larger
than b˜(i`+1/N) ≥ b˜((i`+1 − 1)/N). On the other hand, the empirical bids b̂(q) for q ∈
[i`/N, i`+1/N) lie within [b˜(i`/N), b˜((i`+1−1)/N)]. Therefore, conditioned on i` and i`+1,
the latter set of empirical bids is independent of the former set of empirical bids.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.7 AND THEOREM 3.4. We will use Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds
to bound the expectation of T0,N over the bid sample, conditioned on I and ∆ =
supq∈[0,1] |Gˆ(b(q)) − G(b(q))|. We first note that T0,N has mean zero because for any
integer i ∈ [0, N ], Esamples
[
b̂(i/N)
]
= b˜(i/N).
Next we note that the Ti,j ’s are bounded random variables. Specifically, let Q be an
interval of quantiles over which the difference b̂(q) − b˜(q) does not change sign. Then,
following the proof of Theorem 3.3, we can bound
|TQ| =
∣∣∣∣∫
Q
Z ′y(q)(̂b(q)− b˜(q)) dq
∣∣∣∣
≤ 20∆ sup
q
{y′(q)} log max
{
sup
q:y′(q)≥1
x′(q)
y′(q)
, sup
q
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:S
.
Likewise, over an interval Q where Z ′y does not change sign, we again get |TQ| ≤ 20∆S
with S defined as above. Moreover, for an interval Q over which Z ′y changes sign at
most t times, we have ∫
Q
|Z ′y(q)(̂b(q)− b˜(q))|dq ≤ t · 20∆S.
Finally, noting that Zy is a weighted sum over the n functions Zk defined for the k-unit
auctions, and that by Lemma D.2 each Zk has a unique maximum, we note that Z ′y
changes sign at most 2n times.
We now apply Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds to bound the probability that the sum∑`=k−1
`=0 Ti`,i`+1 exceeds some constant a. With τ` denoting the upper bound on |Ti`,i`+1 |,
this probability is at most
exp
(
− a
2∑
` τ
2
`
)
.
By our observations above, for all `, τ` ≤ 40∆S, and
∑
` τ` ≤
∫ 1
0
|Z ′y(q)(̂b(q)− b˜(q))|dq ≤
40n∆S. Therefore,
∑
` τ
2
` ≤ n(40∆S)2. We can now choose a =
√
n log n 40∆S to make
the above probability at most 1/n.
Putting everything together, we get that conditioned on I and ∆, the expected value
of |T0,N | over the bid sample is at most a + 1/n · 40n∆S = O(1)
√
n log n∆S. Since this
bound is independent of I, the same bound holds when we remove the conditioning on
I. The theorem now follows by plugging in the expected value of ∆ from Lemma 2.2.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.6. We need to bound the probability that the error in estimat-
ing PˆB1 −αPˆB2 is greater than |PB1 −αPB2 |. This error can in turn be decomposed into
the error in estimating PB1 and that in estimating PB2 . Denote a = |PB1 − αPB2 | > 0.
Then,
Pr
(
|(P̂B1 − α P̂B2)− (PB1 − αPB2)| > a
)
≤ Pr
(
|P̂B1 − PB1 | > a/2
)
+ Pr
(
|P̂B2 − PB2 | > a/2α
)
.
Let x denote the allocation rule of the mechanism C that we are running, and let b be
the corresponding bid function. Now, recall that for
∆ = sup
q
|Ĝ(b(q))−G(b(q))|, and S = sup
q
{x′B1(q)} log max
{
sup
q:x′B1 (q)≥1
x′(q)
x′B1(q)
, sup
q
x′B1(q)
x′(q)
}
,
Equation (8), Lemma 3.5, and Lemma 3.7 together imply that (conditional on ∆)
Pr
(
|P̂B1 − PB1 | > a/2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− 1
n(40 ∆S)2
(a
2
−O
( n
N
))2)
.
Now recall that S < n log(n/), and ∆ < constant/
√
N with high probability
(Lemma 2.2). As a result, we establish that for a = ω(n/N),
Pr
(
|P̂B1 − PB1 | > a/2
)
≤ exp
(
−O
(
Na2
n3 log(n/)
))
.
Likewise,
Pr
(
|P̂B2 − PB2 | > a/2α
)
≤ exp
(
−O
(
Na2
α2n3 log(n/)
))
.
